Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values

DOI10.1287/MNSC.42.2.220zbMATH Open0884.90073OpenAlexW1981198635MaRDI QIDQ4363587FDOQ4363587

Authors: J. H. II Lindsey, William F. Samuelson, Richard J. Zeckhauser 

Publication date: 15 December 1997

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.2.220

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdirect revelationsealed-bid procedureseller posted-price procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (3)

• Selling with evidence
• Fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two-enterprise supply chains
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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