Sequential selling mechanisms

DOI10.1007/BF01221202MaRDI QIDQ1341487zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Carl Ehrman, Michael Peters

Publication date 29 May 1995

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01221202

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral communicationmultilateral communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
• Efficient Sequential Bargaining
• A model of competing selling mechanisms

Cites work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Dynamic programming and stochastic control
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Search mechanisms

Cited in

(10)

• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
• Selling multiple units to strategic consumers
• Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
• Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
• The Timing of Sales
• A note on the interaction between buyers and sellers
• Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values
• Asking questions
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation

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