Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105317MaRDI QIDQ2231396zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hagen, Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date 29 September 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral trademechanism designdominant strategiescollusion-proofnessmultidimensional private informationposted prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cited in

(4)

• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Elicitation using multiple price list formats
• Sequential selling mechanisms

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