Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
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Publication:4530935
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00006zbMath1023.91504OpenAlexW2077686198MaRDI QIDQ4530935
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00006
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