Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
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Publication:1867526
DOI10.1006/jeth.2002.2940zbMath1032.91090OpenAlexW1984286389MaRDI QIDQ1867526
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2940
Noncooperative games (91A10) Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (29)
The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies ⋮ Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem ⋮ Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies ⋮ Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. ⋮ Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
Cites Work
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- A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness and markets
- Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
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