Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies

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Publication:1867526

DOI10.1006/jeth.2002.2940zbMath1032.91090OpenAlexW1984286389MaRDI QIDQ1867526

Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2940




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