Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
From MaRDI portal
Publication:900413
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016zbMath1330.91108OpenAlexW1900787763MaRDI QIDQ900413
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Albin Erlanson
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems, Rationing rules and stable coalition structures, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Asymmetric parametric division rules
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
- Kidney Exchange
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- What Is Just?
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- Fair Net Trades
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
