Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- Asymmetric parametric division rules
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
- Collective rationality and monotone path division rules
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Fair Net Trades
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
- Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
- Kidney Exchange
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- What Is Just?
Cited in
(10)- Resource-distribution via Boolean constraints
- Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
- Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6125177 (Why is no real title available?)
- Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
- Equivalence and strategy-proofness of no anonymous priority resource allocation mechanisms
- A task-allocation problem
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