Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
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Publication:463398
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193821 (Why is no real title available?)
- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results
Cited in
(4)- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- On strategy-proof direct mechanism of active expertise over strictly convex compact set
- An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
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