A task-allocation problem

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.004MaRDI QIDQ2425161zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingstrategy-proofnessmechanismtaskwillingly acceptable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(8)

• Multi-agent task allocation under unrestricted environments
• Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
• On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 147743 (Why is no real title available?)
• Task assignment with unknown duration
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3922353 (Why is no real title available?)
• On two mechanisms in job rotation problems
• The simple and multiple job assignment problems

This page was built for publication: A task-allocation problem

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2425161)