A task-allocation problem

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.004zbMATH Open1417.91290OpenAlexW2940113396MaRDI QIDQ2425161FDOQ2425161

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.004

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingstrategy-proofnessmechanismtaskwillingly acceptable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Pairwise kidney exchange

Cited In (4)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Task assignment with unknown duration
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The simple and multiple job assignment problems

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