Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01465-XMaRDI QIDQ6074836zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julien Combe

Publication date 19 September 2023

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01465-x

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptancematchingminimal envyprioritiesreallocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A dynamic school choice model
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
• Kidney Exchange
• Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• On cores and indivisibility
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

Cited in

(9)

• Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?
• A task-allocation problem
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• Reallocation with priorities
• Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
• Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching

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