Reallocation with priorities
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A dynamic school choice model
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Matching markets with mixed ownership: the case for a real-life assignment mechanism
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Non-bossiness
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- On cores and indivisibility
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- School Choice with Consent*
- Social choice and individual values
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
This page was built for publication: Reallocation with priorities
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6188682)