Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
- A market-based mechanism for allocating space shuttle secondary payload priority
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Mutually best matches
- Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Fair student placement
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Intertemporal equity and efficient allocation of resources.
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Gradual college admission
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Manipulability in school choice
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Priority matchings revisited
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Incentives in landing slot problems
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- A dynamic school choice model
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Efficient priority rules
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Menu mechanisms
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Optimization-based mechanisms for the course allocation problem
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- A model of access in the absence of markets
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Comment on: ``Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities
- Allocation with weak priorities and general constraints
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- House allocation problems with existing tenants and priorities for teacher recruitment
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Decentralized job matching
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
- Unique stable matchings
- Reallocation with priorities
- Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
- The core of school choice problems
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- Capacity design in school choice
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