Mutually best matches

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.11.003zbMATH Open1396.91575OpenAlexW2419418623MaRDI QIDQ1650271FDOQ1650271

Authors: Hannu Salonen, Mikko A. A. Salonen 

Publication date: 3 July 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.11.003

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zbMATH Keywords

college admissions problemsiterative formationmutual matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On cores and indivisibility
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings

Cited In (3)

• Optimal Pairings
• A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?

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