A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
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Publication:1741752
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.022zbMath1411.91424OpenAlexW2920284990MaRDI QIDQ1741752
Publication date: 7 May 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.022
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Cites Work
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