Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
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Publication:2398192
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0543-9zbMath1398.91459OpenAlexW2274919396MaRDI QIDQ2398192
Publication date: 15 August 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0543-9
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