When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
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Publication:483587
DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0150-1zbMATH Open1302.91155OpenAlexW2053320685MaRDI QIDQ483587FDOQ483587
Authors: Jens Gudmundsson 
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0150-1
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Cites Work
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally Ranked Pairs
- Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
Cited In (11)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- Exchange-stability in roommate problems
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
- Matching with partners and projects
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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