When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0150-1zbMath1302.91155OpenAlexW2053320685MaRDI QIDQ483587

Jens Gudmundsson

Publication date: 17 December 2014

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0150-1

zbMATH Keywords

existencecyclesstable matchingroommate problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ Exchange-stability in roommate problems ⋮ Matching with partners and projects

Cites Work

• Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
• Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally Ranked Pairs
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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