On the operation of multiple matching markets
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Voting by Committees
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Cited in
(10)- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Matching through position auctions
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7238962 (Why is no real title available?)
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