On the operation of multiple matching markets
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.001zbMATH Open1394.91299OpenAlexW2529965891MaRDI QIDQ516981FDOQ516981
Authors: Hidekazu Anno, Morimitsu Kurino 
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=37400
Recommendations
market designstrategy-proofnessdeferred acceptance rulessecond-best incentive compatibilitytop trading cycles rules
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
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Cited In (10)
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Matching through position auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
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