Sequential school choice with public and private schools
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Recommendations
Cites work
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Common enrollment in school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Gradual college admission
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Parallel markets in school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
Cited in
(5)- Capacity design in school choice
- Wastefulness in sequential school choice with public and private schools
- Two stage mechanisms for matching students and supervisors
- Admission based on residential address, academic achievement, and welfare
- Game-theoretic analysis of decentralized college admissions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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