Sequential school choice with public and private schools
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Publication:6624508
DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01527-0MaRDI QIDQ6624508FDOQ6624508
Authors: Tommy Andersson, Umut Mert Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten 
Publication date: 25 October 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- School Choice with Consent*
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Parallel markets in school choice
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Common enrollment in school choice
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Gradual college admission
- Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
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