Sequential school choice with public and private schools

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01527-0MaRDI QIDQ6624508zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tommy Andersson, Umut Mert Dur, Sinan Ertemel, Onur Kesten

Publication date 25 October 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• Constrained school choice
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• School Choice with Consent^*

Cites work

• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Common enrollment in school choice
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Gradual college admission
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
• Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
• On the operation of multiple matching markets
• Parallel markets in school choice
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
• Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
• Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets

Cited in

(1)

• Capacity design in school choice

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