Capacity design in school choice
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Publication:6584598
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.002zbMATH Open1546.91177MaRDI QIDQ6584598FDOQ6584598
Authors: Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Umut Mert Dur, Martin Van der Linden 
Publication date: 8 August 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Introduction to algorithms
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- School Choice with Consent*
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Constrained school choice
- School choice: an experimental study
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
- Self-selection in school choice
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Family ties: school assignment with siblings
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
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