Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
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Publication:4682776
DOI10.3982/TE2195zbMath1396.91568OpenAlexW2617300268MaRDI QIDQ4682776
Daniel E. Fragiadakis, Peter Troyan
Publication date: 19 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2195
diversitydeferred acceptanceschool choicestrategyproofnessaffirmative actionfloorsceilingminimum quotas
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