School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
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Publication:1996170
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.10.007zbMATH Open1458.91145OpenAlexW3098375022MaRDI QIDQ1996170FDOQ1996170
Authors: Ziyang Shen, Zhenhua Jiao 
Publication date: 3 March 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.007
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school choiceresponsivenessefficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanismpriority-based affirmative action
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- School choice under partial fairness
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
Cited In (3)
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