School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1996170
Recommendations
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
Cites work
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice under partial fairness
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
Cited in
(6)- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
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