Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
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Cites work
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Cited in
(7)- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Matching through institutions
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
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