Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
From MaRDI portal
Publication:290161
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003zbMath1347.91201OpenAlexW2320344639MaRDI QIDQ290161
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/152588/1/1_s2.0_S089982561630001X_main_1_.pdf
Related Items
When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?, Matching through institutions, School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution, Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas, College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
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