Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
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Publication:290161
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.003zbMATH Open1347.91201OpenAlexW2320344639MaRDI QIDQ290161FDOQ290161
Authors: Inácio Bó 
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/152588/1/1_s2.0_S089982561630001X_main_1_.pdf
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
Cited In (7)
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Matching through institutions
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
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