Parallel markets in school choice
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Publication:2673220
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.03.003zbMath1492.91223OpenAlexW4220918149MaRDI QIDQ2673220
Piotr Evdokimov, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Bertan Turhan
Publication date: 9 June 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.003
Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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Cites Work
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