Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment
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Publication:738938
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.006zbMath1394.91301OpenAlexW2466007874MaRDI QIDQ738938
Ahrash Dianat, Marco E. Castillo
Publication date: 16 August 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/70687/
Related Items (4)
Fair cake-cutting in practice ⋮ Parallel markets in school choice ⋮ Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment ⋮ Hesitant fuzzy linguistic two-sided matching decision making
Uses Software
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