Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
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Cites work
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Essentially stable matchings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice under partial fairness
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice: an experimental study
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
Cited in
(24)- Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- School choice: an experimental study
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- Principal Stratification Approach to Broken Randomized Experiments
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralized school choice
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Accounting for heterogeneous returns in sequential schooling decisions
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- School choice with costly information acquisition
- Sequential school choice with public and private schools
- An experimental study on strategic preference formation in two-sided matching markets
- Two stage mechanisms for matching students and supervisors
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
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