Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales

DOI10.1287/MNSC.32.12.1599MaRDI QIDQ3747193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald B. Hausch

Publication date 1986

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.12.1599

zbMATH Keywords

biddingsequential or simultaneous auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Recommendations

• Sequential auctions and auction revenue
• Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
• He who must not be named
• Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand

Cited in

(18)

• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Rational risk valuation given sequential reduction opportunities
• He who must not be named
• Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
• Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
• On the evaluation of bidding strategies in sequential auctions
• Uninformed bidding in sequential auctions
• Multiple buying or selling with vector offers
• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions
• Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry
• Auctioning bulk mobile messages
• A model of sequential auctions

This page was built for publication: Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3747193)