School choice under partial fairness
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Recommendations
Cited in
(44)- School Choice with Consent*
- The core of school choice problems
- The properness of weak stability notions
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
- Parallel markets in school choice
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Dorm augmented college assignments
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Capacity design in school choice
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- School choice with vouchers
- Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- School choice with neighbors
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Manipulability in school choice
- Self-selection in school choice
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Obvious manipulations
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Constrained school choice
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Coalitions and cliques in the school choice problem
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
- School choice with farsighted students
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- Essentially stable matchings
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