Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Combinatorial optimization. Theory and algorithms
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Essentially stable matchings
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- On the number of employed in the matching model
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice under partial fairness
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Topological sorting of large networks
Cited in
(17)- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- The core of school choice problems
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Capacity design in school choice
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
- Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
- A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
- School choice under partial fairness
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