School choice with transferable student characteristics

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.007MaRDI QIDQ6148575zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, Antonio Romero-Medina

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

constrained efficiencyprioritiesschool choicetransferable characteristics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• School choice under partial fairness
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
• Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
• On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

Cites work

• (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Essentially stable matchings
• Fair student placement
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• Matching with ownership
• Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
• On cores and indivisibility
• School choice under partial fairness
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

This page was built for publication: School choice with transferable student characteristics

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6148575)