On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient priority rules
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Robust stability in matching markets
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
Cited in
(19)- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Provision-after-wait with preferences ordered by difference: tighter complexity and better approximation
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- On computing Pareto stable assignments
- Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
- The core of school choice problems
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
- Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
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