Recommendations
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Efficiency and fairness criteria in the assignment of students to projects
- Fairness in academic course timetabling
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Fair testing
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910905
- Fairness in Scheduling
- Optimum allocation of places to students in a national university system
Cites work
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3214144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Making just school assignments
- On cores and indivisibility
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- School Choice with Consent*
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
Cited in
(10)- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
- Essentially stable matchings
- Obvious manipulations
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples
- School choice with transferable student characteristics
- The core of school choice problems
- Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise
- The properness of weak stability notions
- Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
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