The properness of weak stability notions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.112163MaRDI QIDQ6957360zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Luosai Zhang

Publication date 16 July 2025

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.112163

zbMATH Keywords

blocking pairpropernessschool choicetwo-sided matchingweak stability notions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Essentially stable matchings
• Fair student placement
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• School choice under partial fairness
• School Choice with Consent^*
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
• Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

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