Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.08.020MaRDI QIDQ1672583zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yasuo Sasaki, Masahiro Ura

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.020

zbMATH Keywords

matchingnursery school choiceserial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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(1)

• Can simple voting rules approximate the group AHP?

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