Market Design
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5150291
DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_655zbMath1455.91165OpenAlexW4252926882MaRDI QIDQ5150291
Akhil Vohra, Fanqi Shi, Fuhito Kojima
Publication date: 15 February 2021
Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_655
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
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