Two-sided matching with interdependent values
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Publication:848607
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.07.004zbMATH Open1202.91234OpenAlexW2097909533MaRDI QIDQ848607FDOQ848607
Authors: Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky 
Publication date: 4 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
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Cites Work
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- Posterior efficiency
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
Cited In (30)
- A dynamic school choice model
- Market Design
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- Bayesian stable states
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
- Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Self-selection in school choice
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
- The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
- Stable matching with incomplete information
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Decision-making with reference information
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
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