Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies

DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01579-4MaRDI QIDQ6657656FDOQ6657656

Authors: Farzad Pourbabaee 

Publication date: 6 January 2025

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

learningoptimal stoppingreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Stochastic orders
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Reputation for Quality
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Generalized convex inequalities
• Strategic Experimentation
• Robust experimentation in the continuous time bandit problem
• Job Matching and the Wage Distribution
• Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices
• Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations
• Breakdowns
• EFFICIENT LEARNING AND JOB TURNOVER IN THE LABOR MARKET
• On games of strategic experimentation
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits
• Stochastic calculus and applications
• Career concerns with exponential learning
• Cautious stochastic choice, optimal stopping and deliberate randomization
• Strategic experimentation with asymmetric players
• Inefficiency of sponsored research
• Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game

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