Inefficiency of sponsored research

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102497MaRDI QIDQ2051002zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Svetlana Boyarchenko

Publication date 1 September 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102497

zbMATH Keywords

strategic experimentationstopping time gamessponsored research

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games of timing (91A55)

Recommendations

• Contingent payments in selection contests
• Researcher's dilemma
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• Rank-order innovation tournaments
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Cites work

• A theory of stopping time games with applications to product innovations and asset sales
• Breakdowns
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
• Continuous-time games of timing
• Dynamic price competition
• Experimentation in Markets
• Investment timing and learning externalities
• Learning and Strategic Pricing
• Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game
• Negatively Correlated Bandits
• On games of strategic experimentation
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
• Stationary multi-choice bandit problems.
• Strategic Experimentation
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
• Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
• Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations

Cited in

(4)

• Researcher's dilemma
• A model of privately funded public research
• Analyzing the efficient allocation of research funds by Bayesian model
• Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies

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