Learning and Strategic Pricing

DOI10.2307/2171959zbMath0856.90037OpenAlexW2173246629MaRDI QIDQ4895059

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 23 February 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d11/d1113.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learning processMarkov perfect equilibriadynamic oligopolyexperimentationmulti-armed bandit problemoligopoly modelasymptotic behavior of the equilibriainfinite stochastic gamesingle consumerstream of goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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