Dynamic common agency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00079-6MaRDI QIDQ1400983zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Publication date 17 August 2003

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00079-6

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic biddingequilibriumMarginal contributionMarkov perfect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Common Agency
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Cites work

• Common Agency
• Complements and substitutes in common agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Learning and Strategic Pricing
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

Cited in

(17)

• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Selecting equilibria in common agency games
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
• Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
• Strategic consensus
• A note on low-price menu auctions
• Dynamic price competition
• Common Agency: Existence of an Equilibrium in the Case of Two Outcomes
• Common Agency
• Common agency with caring agents
• Games Played Through Agents
• Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities

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