Contingent payments in selection contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0030-7MaRDI QIDQ2462902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Derek J. Clark, Christian Riis

Publication date 5 December 2007

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://hdl.handle.net/10037/933

zbMATH Keywords

selectionrank-ordercontingent paymentresearch contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2229941 (Why is no real title available?)
• Efficient Auctions
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Risk taking in selection contests
• Setting the stakes in environmental contests

Cited in

(8)

• Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
• Risk taking in selection contests
• Inefficiency of sponsored research
• Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach
• Rank-order innovation tournaments
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• R\&D outsourcing in an innovation-driven supply chain
• Innovation contests with entry auction

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