Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1621734
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0610-xzbMath1417.91244OpenAlexW2782992744MaRDI QIDQ1621734
Publication date: 9 November 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0610-x
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Innovation contests with entry auction
- The optimal multi-stage contest
- Effective contests
- Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
- Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
- Contests with endogenous entry
- The theory of contests: a survey
- Contest architecture