Strategic experimentation with private payoffs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.017zbMath1330.91044OpenAlexW3123108533MaRDI QIDQ900444

Sven Rady, Philipp Strack, Paul Heidhues

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.017

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningcheap talkstrategic experimentationinformation externalitytwo-armed banditmediated communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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Cites Work

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