Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
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Publication:263391
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.001zbMATH Open1347.91177OpenAlexW2285690960MaRDI QIDQ263391FDOQ263391
Lucas Maestri, Daniel Gottlieb, Renato Gomes
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102229/1/bandit_mech_design_16_01_28.pdf
Recommendations
- Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
- Screening and financial contracting in the face of outside competition
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Growth under uncertainty with experimentation
- Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Funding Criteria for Research, Development, and Exploration Projects
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
- The importance of being honest
- A principal-agent model of sequential testing
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- Reputation for Quality
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
Cited In (3)
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