Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.001MaRDI QIDQ263391zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Renato Gomes, Daniel Gottlieb, Lucas Maestri

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102229/1/bandit_mech_design_16_01_28.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionbandit problementrepreneurshipexperimentationmulti-dimensional screening

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Screening and financial contracting in the face of outside competition
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Growth under uncertainty with experimentation
• Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3638998 (Why is no real title available?)
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Funding Criteria for Research, Development, and Exploration Projects
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Reputation for Quality
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
• The importance of being honest

Cited in

(4)

• Screening and financial contracting in the face of outside competition
• Delegated concept testing in new product development
• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Strategic experimentation in financial intermediation with threat of entry

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