Private monitoring in auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.007zbMath1142.91470OpenAlexW3123642771MaRDI QIDQ860353

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues

Publication date: 9 January 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2003/ii03-14.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsrepeated gamescartelstacit collusionwithholding information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Strategic experimentation with private payoffs ⋮ First-best collusion without communication ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions ⋮ Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions ⋮ Taking turns ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

Cites Work

• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
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• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
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• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
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• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
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• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Optimal Learning by Experimentation
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
• Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.

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