Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2365328
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0090zbMath0871.90134OpenAlexW1979082611MaRDI QIDQ2365328
Michael Kahneman, Elchanan Ben-Porath
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0090
Related Items
Private monitoring in auctions, Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring, The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games, Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring, Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks, Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, Cooperation in partly observable networked markets, Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks, Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks, Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring., Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring., Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication, Secure message transmission on directed networks, Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring, Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring, Repeated Games with Complete Information, The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs, A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games, A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network, General properties of long-run supergames, Networks of relations and word-of-mouth communication, Strategic buyers and privately observed prices, Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games, Folk theorem with communication, A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games, Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors, Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly, Misreporting behaviour in iterated prisoner's dilemma game with combined trust strategy, Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring, The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring, Repeated games with almost-public monitoring, Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
