Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0493-2zbMATH Open1235.91020OpenAlexW2138321957MaRDI QIDQ647555FDOQ647555

Authors: Kurt Annen 

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0493-2

Recommendations

• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Lying in a finitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
• Social norms and random matching games

Cited In (5)

• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
• Searching games with errors -- fifty years of coping with liars
• Errors of judgment and reporting in a law merchant system
• Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games

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