Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
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Publication:647555
DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0493-2zbMath1235.91020MaRDI QIDQ647555
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0493-2
Cites Work
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Social norms and random matching games
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information