Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
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Publication:647555
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Cites work
- Communication in dynastic repeated games: `Whitewashes' and `coverups'
- Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Social norms and random matching games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(5)- Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- Searching games with errors -- fifty years of coping with liars
- Errors of judgment and reporting in a law merchant system
- Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
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