Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09715-6MaRDI QIDQ2300604zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrej Angelovski, Daniela Di Cagno, Francesca Marazzi, Werner Güth

Publication date 27 February 2020

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/28306/1/Theory%26Decision_Revised.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcheap talkprivate informationacquiring-a-company game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders
• To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation
• Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring
• Information acquisition and disclosure by firms in the presence of additional available information
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study
• Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets

Cites work

• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: an experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation
• Truth or consequences: an experiment
• What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods

Cited in

(2)

• Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: an experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation
• To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2300604)