Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.009zbMath1470.91149OpenAlexW3169268840MaRDI QIDQ2049476

Jesal D. Sheth

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228351

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcompetitionconflict of interestdisclosureverifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Blockchain's role in e-commerce sellers' decision-making on information disclosure under competition ⋮ Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: is sharing caring? ⋮ Competition in persuasion: an experiment ⋮ Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment ⋮ Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
• The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
• Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies*
• What You See Is All There Is*
• Cursed Equilibrium

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