Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders
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Publication:2452263
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0616-4zbMATH Open1287.91073OpenAlexW2158276958MaRDI QIDQ2452263FDOQ2452263
Authors: Shin Sato 
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0616-4
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Cited In (6)
- Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
- On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence
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