Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0616-4MaRDI QIDQ2452263zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shin Sato

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0616-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(6)

• Local incentive compatibility with transfers
• Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
• A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
• Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence
• On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

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