On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6584587
Recommendations
- New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on Gale's example
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
- Can everyone benefit from innovation?
- Fair Net Trades
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies
- Population monotonic rules for fair allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
Cited in
(1)
This page was built for publication: On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6584587)
