On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.012zbMATH Open1546.9115MaRDI QIDQ6584587FDOQ6584587

Authors: William Thomson 

Publication date: 8 August 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

no-envyegalitarian-equivalenceaugmentation-proofnessendowment lower bound

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Fair Net Trades
• Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Monotone strategyproofness
• Can everyone benefit from innovation?
• On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies

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