Population monotonic rules for fair allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0236-8MaRDI QIDQ1767289zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H. Kim

Publication date 8 March 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0236-8

zbMATH Keywords

dominationequal division lower boundprivate good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Review text

We consider the property of population monotonicity in the context of fair allocation problems in private good economies. It is already known that the property is compatible with the equal division lower bound. We show that if the equal division lower bound is replaced with no envy, the compatibility does not hold. We also show that the incompatibility persists even though no envy is weakened to no domination or epsi-no domination. Hence, among the fairness criteria mentioned above, only the equal division lower bound is compatible with population monotonicity.

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